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576 MINTON tI. CAVANEY [56C.2d 
[L. A. No. 25881. In Bank. Sept. 6,196L] 
WILLIAM MINTON et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. 
. MAUDE N. CA V ANEY, as Executrix, etc., Defendant 
and Appellant.-
[1] Corporations-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Alter Ego of 
Individuals.-The figurative tenninology "alter ego" and "dis-
regard of the corporate entity" is generally used to refer to the 
various situations that are an abuse of the corporate privilege. 
[2] Id. - Disregard of Corporate Entity - When Power Will Be 
ExerciBed.-The equitable owners of a corporation are perSOll-
ally liable when they treat the assets of the corporation as 
their own and add or withdraw capital from the corporation 
at will, when they hold themselves out as being personally 
liable for debts of the corporation, or when they provide inade-
quate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of 
corporate affairs. 
[3] leL-DiBregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.-Evidence that 
an individual who was not only the secretary and treasurer 
of a corporation but also a director was to receive a third of 
the shares supported an inference that he was an equitable 
owner, and evidence that for a time the records of the corpora-
tion were kept in his offie.e supported an inference that he 
actively participated in the conduct of the business. The trial 
court was not required to believe his statement that he was 
only a "temporary" director and officer "for accommodation" j 
in any event it merely raised a conflict in the evidence that 
was resolved adversely to defendant (executrix of his will). 
[4] IeL-Officers-Liability.-A person may not divorce the respon-
sibility of a director of a corporation from the statutory duties 
and powers of that office by accepting the office as an "accom-
modation" with the understanding that he would not exercise 
any of the duties of a director. 
[1] Disregarding corporate existence, notes, 1 A.L.R. 610; 34 
A.L.R. 597. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 8; Am.Jur., Cor-
porations, § 4. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Corporations, §§ 5(1), 5(4); [2, 5] 
Corporations, § 6(1); [3] Corporations, § 8(5); [4] Corporations, 
§ 686; [6] Abatement, § 42; [7] Judgments, § 418; [8] Limitation 
of Actions, §§ 136, 140; [9] Judgments, §§ 418, 424; [10] Judg-
ments, § 424. 
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[6] Id. - Disregard of Corporate Entity - When Power Will Be 
Exercised.-The "alter ego" doctrine is not restricted to con-
tractual debts, but may apply to tort claims. 
[6] Abatement - Death of Party. - In an action to hold an indi-
vidual personally liable on a judgment against a corporation 
in a prior wrongful death action, plaintiffs' cause of action 
did not abate when the individual died. 
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In an 
action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment 
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action in which 
the individual was not a party, the judgment in the action 
against the corporation did not bar plaintiffs from bringing 
the present action. 
[8] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Failure to Plead as Waiver: 
Demurrer.-In an action to hold an individual personally liable 
on a judgment against a corporation in n prior wrongful death 
action, such individual waived the defense of the statute of 
limitations by failing to plead that defense in the answer to 
the complaint or speeifying the statute as a ground of general 
demurrer. 
[9] Judgments-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In an 
action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment 
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action, the 
individual or his estate could not be held liable for the debts 
of the corporation without opportunity to relitigate the issues 
of the corporation's negligence or amount of damages sustained 
where the individual was not a party to the action against the 
corporation and the judgment in the prior action was therefore 
not binding on him unless he controlled the litigation leading 
to the judgment. The filing of an answer to the complaint 
against the corporation as its then lawyer without :my other 
participation wm; not sl1ffi('ient to hind him. 
[10] Id.-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In order that 
the rule that a person in control of litigation is bound by the 
judgment should control, it is necessary that the one in whose 
favor or against whom the rules of res judicata operate par-
ticipate in the control of the action and if judgment is adverse, 
be able to determine whether or not an appeal should be taken. 
It is not sufficient that he supplies the funds for the prosecu-
tion or defense, that he appears as a witness or cooperates 
without having control. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 237,243; Am.Jur., 
Limitation of Actions, §§ 405, 410, 442. 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 262 et seq. 
56 C.2d-lll 
) 
578 MINTON V. CAVANEY [56 C.2d 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment 
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action. Judg-
ment for plaintiffs reversed. 
William E. McIntyre for Defendant and Appellant. 
William M. Cavaney, in pro. per., as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
Charles H. Manaugh, Michael K. Lanning and Sidney L. 
Gelber for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The Seminole Hot Springs Corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as Seminole, was duly incorporated in 
California on March 8,1954. It conducted a public swimming 
pool that it leased from its owner. On June 24, 1954, plain-
tiffs t daughter drowned in the pool, and plaintiffs recovered 
a judgment for $10,000 against Seminole for her wrongful 
death. The judgment remains unsatis1ied. 
·On January 30, 1957, plaintiffs brought the present action 
to hold defendant Cavaney personally liable for the judgment 
against Seminole. Cavaney died on May 28, 1958, and his 
widow, the executrix of his estate, was substituted as defend-
ant. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs for 
$10,000. Defendant appeals. 
Plaintiffs introduced evidence that Cavaney was a director 
and secretary and treasurer of Seminole and that on November 
15, 1954, about five months after the drowning, Cavaney as 
secretary of Seminole and Edwin A. Kraft as president of 
Seminole applied for permission to issue three shares of 
Seminole stock, one share to be issued to Kraft, another to 
F. J. Wettrick and the third to Cavaney. The Commissioner 
of Corporations refused permission to issue these shares unless 
additional information was furnished. The application was 
then abandoned and no shares were ever issued. There was 
also evidence that for a time Seminole used Cavaney's office 
to keep records and to receive mail. Before his death Cavaney 
answered certain interrogatories. He was asked if Seminole 
"ever had any assets'" He stated that "insofar as my own 
personal knowledge and belief is concerned said corporation 
did not have any assets." Cavaney also stated in the return 
I 
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to an attempted execution that" [I]nsofar as I know, this 
corporation had no assets of any kind or character. The cor-
poration was duly organized but never functioned as a 
corporation.' , 
Defendant introduced evidence that Cavaney was an attor-
ney at law, that he was approached by Kraft and Wettrick 
to form Seminole, and that he was the attorney for Seminole. 
Plaintiffs introduced Cavaney's answer to several interroga-
tories that he held the post of secretary and treasurer and 
director in a temporary capacity and as an accommodation 
to his client. 
Defendant contends that the evidence does not support the 
court's determination l that Cavaney is personally liable for 
Seminole's debts and that the "alter ego" doctrine is inappli-
cable because plaintiffs failed to show that there was" '(1) ... 
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate per-
sonalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of thc 
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.'" 
(Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal.2d 574, 580 [335 P.2d 107]; 
.ilutomotriz etc. De Oalifornia v. Resnick, 47 Ca1.2d 792, 796 
[306 P.2d 1, 63 A.L.R.2d 1042] ; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 
481,487 [202 P. 673].) 
[1] The figurative terminology "alter ego" and "disre-
gard of the corporate entity" is generally used to refer to 
the various situations that are an abuse of the corporate 
privilege. (Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946) § 122, 
pp. 292-293; Lattin, Corporations, p. 66; Latty, The Oor-
porate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 
597 (1936).) [2 ] The equitable owners of a corporation, 
for example, are personally liable when they treat the assets 
of the corporation as their own and add or withdraw capital 
from the corporation at will (see Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 
2d 574, 577-581 [335 P.2d 107] ; Thomson v. L. O. Roney & 
00., 112 Cal.App.2d 420, 429 [246 P.2d 1017]) ; when they 
hold themselves out as being personally liable for the debts 
of the corporation (Stark v. Ooker, 20 Ca1.2d 839, 847 [129 
P.2d 390]) ; or when they provide inadequate capitalization 
and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs. 
'Defendant did not request that the findings of the trial court be in· 
eluded in the record on appeal. It must be presumed therefore that the 
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(Attiomotriz etc. De California v. Resnick, supra, 47 Ca1.2el 
792, 796, 797; Riddle v. Leu,schner, supra, 51 CaUd at, 580; 
Stark v. Coker,20 Ca1.2d 839, 846-849 [129 P.2d 390] ; Sh.af-
ford v. Otto Sales Co. Inc., 149 Cal.App.2d 428, 432 r308 P.2d 
428] ; see Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482, 492-493 
{197 P.2d 167]; Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946) 
§ 129, pp. 302-303; Lattin, Corporations, pp. 68-72; Fuller, 
The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Com-
pany, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1373, 1381-1383.) 
In the instant case the evidence is undisputed that there 
was no attempt to provide adequate capitalization. Seminole 
never had any substantial assets. It leased the pool that it 
operated, and the lease was forfeited for failure to pay the 
rent. Its capital was" 'trifling compared with the business 
to be done and the risks of loss .... '" (Automotriz etc. Dc 
California v. Resnick, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 792, 797.) [3] Thc 
evidence is also undisputed that Cavaney was not only thc 
secretary and treasurer of the corporation but was also a 
director. The evidence that Cavaney was to receive one-third 
of the shares to be issued supports an inference that he was 
an equitable owner (see Riddle v. Leuschner, supra, 51 Cal.2d 
574, 580), and th,e evidence that for a time the records of 
the corporation were kept in Cavaney's office supports an 
inference that he actively participated in the conduct of the -
business. The trial court was not required to believe his state-
ment that he was only a co temporary" director and officer 
cc for accommodation." In any event it merely raised a conflict 
in the evidence that was resolved adversely to defendant. More-
over, section 800 of the Corporations Code provides that 
". . • the business and affairs of every corporation shall bc 
controlled by, a board of not less than three directors." De-
fendant does not claim that Cavaney was a director with 
specialized duties (see 5 U.Chi.L.Rev. 668). [4] It is im-
material whether or not he accepted the office of director 
as an "accommodation" with the understanding that he 
would not exercise any of the duties of a director. A person 
may not in this manner divorce the responsibilities of a direc-
tor from the statutory duties and powers of that office. 
[5-7] There is no merit in defendant's contentions that 
the cc alter ego" doctrine applies only to contractual debts 
and not to tort claims (Mirabito v. San Francisco Dairy Co., 
1 Ca1.2d 400, 406 [35 P.2d 513] ; see Ballantine, Corporations 
(rev. ed. 1946) § 127, p. 298) j that plaintiffs' cause of action 
) 
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ahatl'£1 Wll('ll Cavall~Y died (Civ. Codl", § 956; see Damiano v. 
B1I11ting, 40 Cal.App. 566, 567 [181 P. 232]), or that the 
judgment in the action against the corporation bars plaintiffs 
from bringing the present action. (Dillard v. McKnight, 34 
Ca1.2d 209, 214 [209 P.2d 387,11 A.L.R.2d 835].) [8] De-
fendant Cavaney waived the defense of the statute of limi-
tations by failing to plead that defense in the answer to the 
('omplaint or by specifying the statute of limitations as a 
ground of its general demurrer. (Union 8uga.r 00. v. Hollister 
Estate 00., 3 Ca1.2d 740, 741-745 [47 P.2d 273]; Miller v. 
Pa"'ker, 128 Cal.App. 775, 776 [18 P.2d 89]; see Burke v. 
1IIagui,'c, 154 Cal. 456, 462 [98 P. 21] ; 2 Witkin, California 
Procedure, §§ 489, 545, pp. 1476-1477, 1541; 31 Cal.Jur.2d, 
Limitations of Actions, § 243, p. 659.) 
[9] In this action to hold defendant personally liable 
upon the judgment against Seminole plaintiffs did not allege 
or present any evidence on the issue of Seminole's negligence 
or on the amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs. They 
relied sole]y on the judgment against Seminole. Defendant 
correctly contends that Cavaney or his estate cannot be held 
liable for the debts of Seminole without an opportunity to 
relitigate these issues. (Motores De Mexicali v. 811,perior Oourt, 
51 Cal.2d 172, 176 [331 P.2d 1] ; see also Dillard v. McKnight, 
supra, 34 Ca1.2d 209, 214.) Cavaney was not a party to the 
action against the corporation, and the judgment in that 
action is therefore not binding upon him unless he controlled 
the litigation leading to the judgment. (Motores De Mexicali v. 
Superior Oou,·t, supra, 51 Cal.2d 172, 175; Thomson v. L. O. 
Roney"" 00., supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 420, 427; Mirabito v. 8an 
Francisco Daif'Y 00.,8 Ca1.App.2d 54, 58-59 [47 P.2d 530] ; see 
Rest., Judgments, § 84.) Although Cavaney filed an answer 
to the complaint against Seminole as its attorney, he with-
drew before the trial and did not thereafter participate 
therein. The filing of an answer without any other participa-
tion is not sufficient to bind Cavaney. [10] "In order that 
tlle rule stated in this section [that a person in control of the 
litigation is bound by the judgment] should apply it is neces-
sary th&t the one in whose favor or against whom the rules 
of res judicata operate participate ill the control of the action 
and if judgment is adverse, be able to determine whether or 
not an appeal should be taken. It is not sufficient that he 
supplies the funds for the prosecution or defense, that he 
appears as a witness or cooperates without having control." 
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(Rest., Judgments, § 84, comment e; see Moim'cs Dc Mexi-
cali v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 172, 176.) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
.eurred. 
SCHAUER, J., CQncurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the judgment of reversal on the ground that (as stated in the 
majority opinion, ante, p. 581) "In this action to hold 
defendant personally liable upon the jUdgment against 
Seminole plaintiffs did not allege or present any evidence on 
the issue of Seminole's negligence or on the amount of dam-
ages sustained by plaintiffs. They relied solely on the judg-
ment against Seminole. Defendant correctly contends that 
Cavauey or his estate cannot be held liable for the debts of 
Seminole witbout an opportunity to relitigate these issues. 
[Citations.] Cavaney was not a party to the action against 
the corporation, and the judgment in that action is therefore 
not binding upon him .... " 
I dissent from any implication that mere professional activ-
ity by an attorney at law, as such, in the organization of a 
corporation, can constitute any basis for a finding that the 
corporation is the attorney's alter ego or that he is otherwise 
personally liable for its debts, whether based on contract or 
tort. That in such circumstances an attorney does not incur 
any personal liability for debts of the corporation remains 
true whether or not the attorney's professional services include 
the issuance to him of a qualifying share of stock, the attend-
ance at and participation in an organization meeting or meet-
ings, the holding and exercise for such preliminary purposes, 
in the course of his professional services, of an office or offices, 
whether secretary or treasurer or presiding officer or any 
combination of offices in the corporation. 
The acts and services performed in organizing a corporation 
do not constitute the carrying on of business by a corporation. 
In this respect a corporation cannot properly be regarded as 
organized and ready to even begin carrying on business until 
at least qualifying shares of stock have been issued, a stock-
holders' meeting held, by-laws adopted and directors and 
officers elected. Furthermore, a permit from the Commissioner 
of Corporations must have been secured and minimum require-
ments of that agency met before the corporation can secure 
! assets for which its stock may issue (possibly to be impounded 
I 
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on conditions) and without which it cannot (at least nor-
mally) commence business. The scope of a lawYer's services in 
corporate organization may often include advice and direction 
as to the legal architecture of financial structures but does not, 
as such, encompass responsibility for securing assets. 
In the process of developing an idea of a person or persons 
into an embryonic corporation and finally to full legal entity 
status with a permit issued, directors and officers elected, 
and assets in hand ready to begin business, there may often be 
delays. In such event a qualifying share of stock may stand in 
the name of the organizing attorney for substantial periods 
of time. In none of the activities indicated is the corporation 
actually engaging in business. And the lawYer who handles 
the task of determining and directing and participating in 
the steps appropriate to transforming the idea into a compe-
tent legal entity ready to engage in business is not an alter ego 
of the corporation. By his professional acts he has not been 
engaging in business in the name of the corporation; he has 
been merely practicing law. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied October 
4, 1961. 
